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THE DISCOVERABILITY OF SENSITIVE SECURITY
INFORMATION IN AVIATION LITIGATION
LINDA L. LANE*
I. INTRODUCTION
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, if an airline passenger at-
X3empts to board a plane in the United States and is stopped
because he is on a "No-Fly" list or flagged under one of the fed-
eral security guidelines, can he, or you as his attorney, find out
the reasons that he has been selected or placed on that list? Can
he or you find out what list he is on? If his name was not on any
list, can he, or you, determine the reason for singling him out
among the other airline passengers? Almost uniformly the an-
swer to these questions, developed in litigation across the
United States, is "no."
Although different jurisdictions and different judges present
different justifications for refusing to allow discovery of these is-
sues, the common theme in the published opinions is a reluc-
tance to disclose information designated as "Sensitive Security
Information." A plaintiffs inability to access Sensitive Security
Information ("SSI") often defeats that plaintiffs claim that he
was harassed or denied boarding without cause. For many, de-
nial of access to Sensitive Security Information results in dismis-
sal of their claims. Despite the depth of public concern for
privacy issues and the effect this concern has already had on
public policy, the government is not typically asserting privacy
concerns as a reason for withholding information from discov-
ery. Instead, courts are deferring almost entirely to the govern-
ment's designation of Sensitive Security Information and the
perceived need to protect American citizens from potential ter-
rorist attacks at all costs.
* Special thanks go to SaraJ. O'Connell, of Morrison & Foerster LLP, for her
help in researching the topics covered herein.
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II. PROPOSED SECURITY SYSTEMS AND SCREENING
SYSTEMS FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Since September 11, there has been a flurry of activity by pri-
vate airlines and by several federal agencies to improve airline
passenger screening.
The Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") main-
tains two categories of watch-listed names relevant to airline se-
curity: the "No-Fly" list and the "Selectee" list.' Persons on the
No-Fly list are not allowed to board an aircraft; instead, law en-
forcement officials are contacted and the passenger is ques-
tioned and possibly detained.2 Persons on the Selectee list,
however, "may be permitted to board [an] aircraft, but must
first undergo secondary screening. ' Both the No-Fly list and
the Selectee list are administered and maintained by the TSA.4
The TSA has withheld the criteria used for placing people on
these lists.5 As of spring 2005, there were an estimated 30,000 to
40,000 names on the No-Fly list and 30,000 to 40,000 names on
the Selectee list, for a combined total of approximately 70,000
names. 6 "The TSA distributes these watch lists to . . . U.S. air
carriers" and, "[i]n turn, the air carriers screen passengers
against these watch lists [prior to] boarding. In [practice], these
watch lists are downloaded into a handful of computer reserva-
tion systems used by most U.S. air carriers. ' 7
The controlling screening system used by the airlines today is
the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening program
("CAPPS"). CAPPS has been in use since 1999 and was origi-
nally operated by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA").'
CAPPS divides passengers into two categories based on whether
they require additional screening because their Passenger Name
Record ("PNR") is similar to those of individuals on the No-Fly
SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING






6 Id. at 17. There were less than 20 individuals on the No-Fly list on September
11, 2001. BART ELIAS ET AL., HOMELAND SECUIrrY: AIR PASSENGER PRESCREENING
AND COUNTERTERRORISM 1 (2005), http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/
pdf/prescreening.pdf.
7 Id. at 3.
8 SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, supra note 1, at 21.
428
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATI7ON
list or the Selectee list.'" In addition, "certain behavioral charac-
teristics could trigger a passenger for extra scrutiny."'" "[N]ine
of the 19 hijackers [on September 11] were selected by CAPPS
for additional baggage screening, [but as of] September 11, 2001,
CAPPS was not used to select passengers for greater screening at
passenger checkpoints."' 1 Since that time, CAPPS has been ex-
panded and the system is now used for greater passenger-
checked baggage screening as well as expanded passenger
checkpoint screening. 12  One significant problem identified
with the current CAPPS system is that it gives airlines access to
terrorist watch lists."3
Since September 11, several different screening systems have
been proposed and rejected. CAPPS II was authorized by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act ("ATSA"), which was
passed on November 19, 2001, and called for the implementa-
tion of a computer prescreening system for passengers.' 4
CAPPS II "sought to engage in data mining of commercial
records to identify travelers who posed a threat to aviation secur-
ity" and employed "color-coded labels (red, yellow, green)
[which] would identify travelers by the level of risk they repre-
sented."' 5  The proposal was highly controversial and faced
many obstacles from a privacy standpoint.' CAPPS II was aban-
doned in August 2004."7
Once abandoned, the TSA announced that CAPPS II would
be replaced by Secure Flight, billed as a:
next-generation passenger screening program [that would meet
the] goals of using the expanded No-Fly and Selectee lists to
keep known or suspected terrorists off of planes, moving passen-
gers through airport security screening more quickly, and reduc-
ing the number of individuals unnecessarily selected for
secondary screening, all the while fully protecting passengers'
privacy and civil liberties."
Id.
Id.
BART ELIAS ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
1 Id. at 7.
1- SECURIt Fi IGHTi WORKING GROUP, supra note 1, at 21.
1" Id. at 22.
15 Id. at 21.
I Id. at 22.
17 Id. at 23.
"I Id. (quoting On 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Civil Aviation Security:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, United
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Not surprisingly, Secure Flight has also been criticized by the
public and the Government Accountability Office ("GAO").'
Thus, CAPPS will remain .the current passenger screening pro-
gram until a new program is implemented by the government.
III. SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
Prior to September 11, 2001, the FAA had statutory authoriza-
tion to prohibit public disclosure of information if such disclo-
sure would be an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;...
reveal a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or
financial information; ... or be detrimental to the safety of passengers
in air transportation.' 2' A federal regulation created the SSI des-
ignation, and contained both general and specific descriptions
of what constituted SSI.21
The ATSA, passed in November 2001 in response to the at-
tacks on the World Trade Center, "established the TSA as a sub-
part of the Department of Transportation ("DOT") and shifted
the responsibility of civil aviation security from the FAA to the
TSA. The transferred duties included the statutory authority to
make SSI designations. "22 The TSA was eventually transferred
from the DOT to the newly created Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"), whose stated mission is to shield America
from future terrorist attacks.23
The authority to designate SSI remains with the TSA, which
may withhold SSI if it "determines that such disclosure would
'[b]e an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; [r]eveal a
trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or finan-
cial information; or [b]e detrimental to the security of transporta-
tion.' ,,24 This new statutory language broadened the scope of
SSI to include anything "detrimental to the security of transpor-
tation" as a whole.25 This federal statute instructs the Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security to "prescribe regula-
States House of Representatives, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (testimony of David M. Stone,
Assistant Sec'y of Homeland Sec.)).
19 Id. at 23-25.
20 49 U.S.C.A. § 40119 (West 2001) (emphasis added).
21 14 C.F.R. § 191.7 (2002).
22 Sara Bodenheimer, Comment, Super Secret Information? The Discoverability of
Sensitive Security Information as Designated by the Transportation Security Administra-
tion, 73 U. Mo. KAN. CrTY L. REv. 739, 742 (2005).
23 Id.
24 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(s) (West 2005)) (emphasis added).
2 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(s).
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tions prohibiting the disclosure of [SSI] obtained or developed
in carrying out security" under the ATSA.2'
The TSA authored federal regulations and, mirroring 49
U.S.C. § 114(s), defined SSI as:
information obtained or developed in the conduct of security ac-
tivities, including research and development, the disclosure of
which TSA has determined would - (1) Constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy (including, but not limited to, infor-
mation contained in any personnel, medical, or similar file); (2)
Reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information ob-
tained from any person; or (3) Be detrimental to the security of
transportation.' 7
The regulation goes on to list sixteen specific examples of infor-
mation which constitute SSI.28 Relevant categories of informa-
tion include: security programs or security contingency plans
approved by DOT or DHS; Security Directives or orders issued
by TSA; notices issued by DHS or DOT regarding a threat to
aviation transportation; performance specifications or descrip-
tions of test procedures; details of any security inspection or in-
vestigation of an alleged violation of aviation transportation
security requirements; specific details of aviation transportation
security measures; information regarding security screening
under aviation transportation security requirements; and any
other information not otherwise described which TSA deter-
mines is SSI.2'-
IV. WHO IS ENTITLED TO ACCESS SSI?
Disclosure of SSI is limited to statutorily defined "covered per-
sons" who have a "need to know" the information "unless other-
wise authorized in writing by [the] TSA, the Coast Guard, or the
Secretary of DOT." '' This is a two-step determination and a per-
son is entitled to disclosure only if he (1) is a "covered person"
and (2) has a "need to know" the information."'
The first step of the analysis is to determine whether a poten-
tial recipient is a "covered person." Covered persons include:
airport operators; aircraft operators; fixed base operators;
armed security officers; indirect air carriers; owners, charterers,
26 Id.
27 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
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or operators of a vessel; owners or operators of a maritime facil-
ity; persons performing the function of a computer reservation
system or global distribution system for airline passenger infor-
mation; persons participating in a national or area security com-
mittee; industry trade associations that represent covered
persons; persons conducting research and development activi-
ties that relate to aviation or maritime transportation security;
persons who have access to SSI; persons employed by, con-
tracted to, or acting for a covered person; persons for which a
vulnerability assessment has been directed, created, held,
funded, or approved; and each person receiving SSI under
§1520.15(d) or (e). 2 Because the regulation includes "persons
employed by, contracted to, or acting for a covered person," at-
torneys for covered persons, such as airlines, automatically qual-
ify as covered persons and will often gain access to SSI. 3
The second requirement is a "need to know" the requested
SSI. A person has a "need to know" SSI in each of the following
circumstances:
(1) When the person requires access to specific SSI to carry
out transportation security activities approved, accepted, funded,
recommended, or directed by DHS or DOT.
(2) When the person is in training to carry out transportation
security activities approved, accepted, funded, recommended, or
directed by DHS or DOT.
(3) When the information is necessary for the person to super-
vise or otherwise manage individuals carrying out transportation
security activities approved, accepted, funded, recommended, or
directed by the DHS or DOT.
(4) When the person needs the information to provide techni-
cal or legal advice to a covered person regarding transportation
security requirements of Federal law.
(5) When the person needs the information to represent a cov-
ered person in connection with any judicial or administrative
proceeding regarding those requirements.34
Again, attorneys representing covered persons, such as airlines,
qualify as having a "need to know" and, therefore, both require-
ments are met for access to SSI. However, attorneys represent-
ing covered persons are typically defense attorneys. There is no
similar provision dealing with civil litigants in general or those
32 Id. § 1520.7.
33 Id.
34 Id. § 1520.11.
432
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on the plaintiffs' side of the bar who need the information in
order to bring a lawsuit against a covered person."
All requests for SSI by persons who do not fall within the
need-to-know category are referred to the TSA.3" Under the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") or the Privacy Act of
1974, records containing SSI will be released with the SSI re-
dacted 7 In addition, the TSA or Coast Guard "may make an
individual's access to the SSI contingent upon satisfactory com-
pletion of a security background check or other procedures and
requirements for safeguarding SSI.U''M
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SSI
"When a request for information is made to the TSA, [in]
pending litigation, the [TSA] makes a determination of whether
the requested information constitutes SSI. '"" If it is determined
to be SSI, the TSA issues a final order labeling the documents
SSI for purposes of the request.4" The TSA makes individual
rulings for every request, issuing final orders for or against re-
lease as appropriate. In civil litigation, the typical procedure is
as follows:
The plaintiff makes discovery requests of the defendant, [typi-
cally an airline or other covered person], with some requests in-
volving potential SSI. The requests are sent to the TSA by the
defendant and the TSA then issues a final order on what sections
of the requests constitute SSI. Any information contained within
this final order becomes undiscoverable. Typically, non-redacted
versions of the SSI are sent [to the trialjudge who makes a deter-
mination as to whether the SSI is relevant in response to the re-
quests]. However, the trial judge is without Uurisdiction] to
determine whether the SSI designation under the TSA's final or-
der is appropriate.4'
Instead, a plaintiff's only means of appealing a final order by the
TSA is to file "a petition for review in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of
appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the person
:15 Bodenheimer, supra note 22, at 746.
36 49 C.F.R. § 1520.9 (a)(3).
'17 Id. § 1520.15(b).
I ld. § 1520.11 (c).
Bodenheimer, supra note 22, at 746 (internal citations omitted).
41) Id.
4' Id. at 746-47.
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resides or has its principal place of business."42 "The Court of
Appeals is the only entity outside of the DOT or the DHS with
the ability to review SSI designations."" So far, there are no
published appellate court cases appealing a final order by the
TSA in this manner.
VI. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF SSI POST-
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
A. OVERVIEW
A little over five years have passed since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 and the creation of the TSA. In that short
time, there have been numerous allegations of discrimination
filed by passengers against airlines in response to their imple-
mentation of air transportation security measures. This section
examines examples of those cases and shows how courts are pro-
tecting and limiting the discoverability of SSI.
B. COURT DECISIONS
The unifying theme of the court decisions addressing SSI is
the willingness of courts to defer, almost completely, to the
TSA's designation of SSI. Many times this deference results in
the plaintiff (and plaintiffs counsel) being restricted, and often
prohibited, from viewing the SSI even when it is essential to the
maintenance of their claim. However, plaintiffs seem to have
more success in receiving potential SSI from the TSA through
litigating a denied FOIA request than through traditional dis-
covery methods. Although a district court does not have juris-
diction to review information to determine whether the TSA
properly designated SSI after the TSA makes a final order, a dis-
trict court can review similar information to determine whether
a FOIA exemption is being properly applied.
1. Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines
In Kalantar, the plaintiff was an Iranian-born physician and
permanent United States resident who was prohibited from
boarding a flight to Germany after he refused to allow his lug-
gage to be searched." The Lufthansa agent who told him of the
necessary search said that she was acting pursuant to a FAA se-
42 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(a) (West 2003).
43 Bodenheimer, supra note 22, at 747.
44 Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 276 F. Supp. 2d 5, 6 (D.D.C. 2003).
434
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
curity directive, but would not produce a copy of the directive.47
The agent also stated that the plaintiff "must know that the
United States Government is against all Iranians" and that the
plaintiff was a "security threat."4" The would-be passenger sued
on numerous claims (including race and national origin dis-
crimination, defamation, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress), and Lufthansa filed an ex parte
motion for summary judgment under seal.47 Lufthansa argued
that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because its
conduct was compelled by an FAA directive, which it said the
law forbade them to disclose.4" The plaintiffs proposed that
their attorney be permitted to review the motion subject to a
court order that he not disclose any information regarding the
security directive to anyone, including the plaintiffs
themselves."
At the hearing, the defense attorney stated that the FAA told
him that although contents of the security directive had been
released to different counsel in similar cases, in this case the
directive would be withheld because the passenger and his attor-
ney were involved in advocacy groups that fight discrimination
against Iranians."' The court ordered defense counsel to dis-
close the summary judgment motion to the plaintiff's counsel,
ordered the plaintiffs counsel not to reproduce the motions or
disclose its contents to anyone, even his client, and then deliv-
ered a copy of the order to the TSA.5 ' The TSA moved to stay
the court's order.52
The TSA explained that SSI was at issue, and that disclosure
to anyone without an operational need to know the information
could jeopardize public safety. 3 The TSA proposed making
available to the court, ex parte, additional information about the
security directive at issue. 54 The court then ordered the defend-
45 Id. at 7.
46 Id.
47 Id.
41 Id. at 7 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 108.18(d) (2001) as the regulation forbidding
disclosure).
49 Id. at 7.
50 Id. at 7-8.
51 Id. at 8.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 9.
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ants to file their motion for summary judgment as redacted by
the TSA, and to file it under seal.5 -
This case is significant in demonstrating the power and influ-
ence the TSA has when determining that something is SSI. It
also shows that the TSA, even though not a party to an action,
"can directly affect a defendant's motions through changing
and redacting information." As stated above, 56 the court in Ka-
lantar ordered the defendants to file their summary judgment
motion "as redacted by the TSA. 5 7
2. Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc.
Torbet involved a plaintiff whose carry-on bag was selected for
a random search after the bag had passed through an x-ray scan
without arousing any suspicion. 5' The passenger refused the ad-
ditional search and attempted to exit the airport, but police
were summoned and refused to allow him to leave until after his
bag was searched. 59 Nothing of note was found during the
search, and the passenger boarded the plane with his carry-on
luggage.60
Later, the passenger sued on several claims, including consti-
tutional violations, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and
negligence.6" The district court ordered the airline defendant
to produce documents, under a protective order, describing the
security measures in effect when the passenger's bag was
searched.62 The airline asked for a modification of the court
order based on a letter from the FAA stating that the security
procedures constituted SSI and were therefore not subject to
disclosure even under a protective order.63 The court modified
its order and required the defendants to produce the security
directives under seal for in camera review only.6 4 The defendants
did so and the court granted the defendants' motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, noting that the security directives au-
55 Id. at 14.
56 Bodenheimer, supra note 22, at 756.
57 Kalantar, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 14.




62 Id. at 1088-89.




thorized random physical inspections of bags that have
successfully passed through the x-ray machines.",
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the airport security
measures used by the defendants were compliant with the
Fourth Amendment and were reasonable." The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings
because the plaintiff "impliedly consented to the random search
by placing his bag on the x-ray conveyor belt."' 7
This case is similar to Kalantar in that it shows the high defer-
ence paid to the FAA or TSA's determination that information
constitutes SSI and is therefore not subject to disclosure, even
pursuant to a protective order. The court then has the ability to
review the materials on its own and decide whether they support
the defense position without any input or oversight by the
plaintiff.
3. Chowdhuiy v. Northwest Airlines Corp.
In Chowdhuyy, the plaintiff claimed that Northwest Airlines re-
fused to permit him to board a flight because of his race and
national origin. ' The plaintiff requested documents and inter-
rogatories from Northwest Airlines in order to support his
claim.6" The airline withheld certain documents from discovery,
refused to answer certain interrogatories, and prevented an em-
ployee from answering questions at a deposition because the
material sought was SSI.7 " Northwest Airlines submitted its doc-
ument production and interrogatory responses to the TSA for
review, and the TSA issued a "Final Order" preventing disclo-
sure of certain documents and redacting information from
other documents and interrogatory responses.7' The TSA then
provided unredacted copies of all the withheld documents to
the court for in camera review.12 The plaintiff moved for an "'at-
torneys' eyes only' protective order" for the SSI, arguing that
TSA regulations cannot trump the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."7:
65 Id.
It' d. at 1090.
67 /d. at 1089.





T Id. at 609-10.
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The Court denied the motion for protective order.14 It rea-
soned that the federal statute commanding the TSA to adopt
regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information that would
be "detrimental to the security of transportation" did not make
an exception for civil litigation, therefore the statute effectively
creating an evidentiary privilege under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b) (1) for information that the TSA determines would
be detrimental to air safety if disclosed.75 The court noted that
49 U.S.C. § 114(s) made an exception to allow certain congres-
sional committees access to the information, and suggested that
if Congress had not intended to withhold information from civil
litigants it could have made a similar statutory exception for
them.7 6
The court likened this case to the situation in Baldridge v. Sha-
piro, in which it was held that the Freedom of Information Act
could not be used to compel disclosure of information collected
by the Bureau of the Census because the relevant federal stat-
utes prohibited the Bureau from releasing information without
providing for any discretion by the Bureau.77 Although the
plaintiff in this case argued that the TSA was provided with dis-
cretion in determining what information constitutes SSI, the
court held that Congress may delegate the task of identifying
privileged information to a federal agency.7" In fact, the court
held that SSI, "by its very nature, cannot be precisely identified
in advance," and that the type of information the agency consid-
ers SSI varies with the circumstances.7 9 The plaintiff claimed
"that his due process rights [were] violated when he [was] pro-
hibited from discovering information that could [have helped]
him prove his statutory claim."8' The court held, however, that
if a privilege exists information may be withheld "even if it is
74 Id. at 615. Although the court denied the motion for protective order, it
held that "[i]f the TSA believed that it would not be detrimental to air safety to
disclose the withheld material pursuant to an 'attorneys eyes only' protective or-
der section 114(s) would not prohibit the TSA from adopting regulations permit-
ting the disclosure of such information." Id. at 614. Here, however, the TSA
determined that such disclosure, even if subject to a protective order, would be
harmful. Id.
75 Id. at 610-12.
76 Id. at 612.
77 Id. at 611 (citing Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S 345, 356 (1982)).
78 Id. at 612.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 615.
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relevant to the lawsuit and essential to the establishment of
plaintiff's claim."'"
Finally, the court found that the plaintiff's substantive claim
that there could be no harm to the safety of air transportation
by disclosing the relevant information to the plaintiff's attorney
subject to a protective order was a challenge to the TSA's deter-
mination that the materials constituted SSI in the first place.8 2
The district court reiterated that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
such a claim because Congress had provided that review of TSA
non-disclosure determinations must be performed exclusively by
the Court of Appeals."3
This case is important in its holding that "SSI can constitute
an evidentiary privilege, therefore unreachable through tradi-
tional discovery methods, and that a district court has the ability
to determine that SSI is not necessary to a plaintiff's claim" with-
out giving a thorough explanation.84 Also, the court's statement
that SSI cannot be defined in advance grants the TSA incredibly
broad power in labeling information as SSI.8 5 This case illus-
trates that requesting information through traditional discovery
methods is ineffective when the information requested is SSI.8U "
4. Gordon v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Gordon, another decision by the Northern District of Califor-
nia, was decided just two months after Chowdhury by the same
judge, Judge Charles R. Breyer.8 7 Here, plaintiffs filed a FOIA
action seeking records regarding the "No-Fly" list and other
transportation watch lists from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion ("FBI") and TSA. The court reviewed materials desig-
nated as "classified" in camera and determined that they were
exempt from FOIA disclosure requirements. 9 However, the
court also reviewed other information withheld by the govern-
ment and held that the government "in many instances . . . ap-
plied [FOIA] exemptions broadly and without providing a
81 Id. at 610 (citing Baldidge, 455 U.S. at 360).
112 Id. at 613-14.
83 Id. at 614.
84 Bodenheimer, supra note 22, at 759.
'5 Id.
Ih d.
'1 See Gordon v. FBI, 390 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Chowdhury v. Nw.
Airlines Corp., 226 F.R.D. 608 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Gordon, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 899.
I ld. at 903.
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detailed explanation of why the withheld material [was]
exempt."9 0
Before making its decision, the court explained that "FOTA
entitles private citizens to access government records"'9 and that
"[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted the disclosure provisions
broadly, noting that the [A] ct" was meant to provide full agency
disclosure.92 However, FOLA also contains nine exemptions that
"a government agency can invoke to protect . . . documents
from public disclosure. ' " "Unlike [FOIA's] disclosure provi-
sions... its statutory exemptions must be narrowly construed
... [and] the agencies resisting public disclosure . . . have the
burden of proving the applicability of an exception."9
FOIA third exemption excepts from disclosure matters that
are exempted by statute.95 The TSA claimed that statutes 49
U.S.C. § 114(s) and 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) prohibited disclosure
of certain redacted security directive information, but the court
held that some of this information did not, on its face, appear to
be SSI. 96 For example, the court stated that information about
the number of persons identified as "no transport" prior to Sep-
tember 11, 2001, was not SSI subject to nondisclosure, but was
simply historical fact. 7 The court also called on the govern-
ment to explain why the number of names on the No-Fly and
Selectee Lists should be exempt.98 Finally, the court stated that
the fact that watch lists include persons who pose a threat to
aviation is innocuous "common sense and widely known" infor-
mation rather than SSI.99
FOIA exemption 7(C) exempts materials compiled for law en-
forcement purposes that can "reasonably be expected to consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of privacy."'' ° The FBI applied
this exemption to redact information sent to them by a Wall
Street Journal reporter that summarized "the complaints of sev-
90 Id. at 899.
91 Id. (citing Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quota-
tion omitted)).
92 Id. (citing Lion Raisins v. United States Dep't of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1079
(9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted)).
93 Id.
94 Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
95 Id.




100 Id. at 900-11 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c)).
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eral American peace activists ... who claim they were told they
were on a No-Fly list."''" The court held that because the infor-
mation was sent by the reporter while working on a story, the
government did not satisfy its burden of showing that the e-mail
was received for a law enforcement purpose.112 Also, the court
held that the government did not demonstrate that "disclosing
the information would involve an unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy" because it could have redacted names and identifying in-
formation only, rather than "redact[ing] the entire discussion of
each incident."'"' °
Exemption 6 of FOIA exempts personnel and medical files
from disclosure where they would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy. 1114 The court held that the TSA's re-
daction of the names of office-holders and information that was
not personal in nature was unjustified under this exemption.10 5
The court ordered the government defendants to review all of
the withheld material and "determine whether they believe[d]
in good faith that the material [was] in fact exempt" from disclo-
sure, to provide a detailed affidavit explaining why the material
was exempt, and to file a motion for summary judgment after a
review and further production had been made.11 6 The court
warned the defendants to keep in mind that it was their burden
to prove that an exemption applied and that such exemptions
are narrowly construed.1 0 7 The court further cautioned that
"[g]eneral statements that, for example, the information is
[SSI], are inadequate to satisfy the government's burden."'10 8
As noted above, Gordon was decided by the same district court
judge that decided Chowdhwy. 9 Examining these cases in con-
junction, the following principle becomes apparent:
[A plaintiff] may have a better chance of receiving information
from the TSA through litigating a denied FOIA request than
through traditional discovery methods. A district court does not
have the authority to review information to determine if it has
been properly designated SSI once the TSA makes a final order.
11) Id. at 901.
102 Id.
103 1i.
'4 Id. at 901-02.




111 See id. at 897; Chowdhuiy v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 226 F.R.D. 608 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
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However, the district court can review information to determine
[whether] a FOIA exemption is being properly applied. In addi-
tion, the burden is on the government to prove its position. 1'
5. Jifry v. Federal Aviation Administration
In Jifry, two non-resident alien pilots from Saudi Arabia filed a
claim challenging aviation regulations adopted in the wake of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 1 ' "The pilots con-
tend [ed] that the new procedures I,]" which resulted "in the rev-
ocation of their airman certificates issued by the [FAA,] violated
the Administrative Procedure Act ... and the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment."' 1 2 The plaintiffs also objected to the
government's reliance on SSI and classified information."'
The court explained that after September 11 Congress dele-
gated the responsibility for prescribing air commerce and na-
tional security safety regulations to the FAA, then transferred
this responsibility to the newly-created TSA."14 The TSA pub-
lished new regulations that provided for automatic suspension
of airman certificates when a pilot poses a security threat." 5
The plaintiffs' licenses were revoked pursuant to these regula-
tions.116 The pilots appealed the decision and requested the
materials upon which the revocation was issued." 7 The TSA
provided some materials but "not the factual basis for [the]
TSA's determination" to revoke the licenses, "which was based
on classified information." ' 18 The pilots argued that the revoca-
tions were not supported by substantial evidence."'
The court explained it has the "inherent authority to review
classified material ex parte [and] in camera as part of its judicial
review function," and therefore conducted an ex parte in camera
review of the classified intelligence reports. 20 The court held
that because it reviewed the classified material itself, the court
was "in a position to determine whether it was properly classi-
110 Bodenheimer, supra note 22, at 761-62 (internal citations omitted).
I1I Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
112 Id. at 1176.
113 Id. at 1182.
114 Id. at 1177.
115 Id.
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fled," and affirmed that there was substantial evidence that the
pilots were security risks.' The court also determined that
even though the regulation at issue (49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)
(2005)) provides that "a person has a 'need to know sensitive
security information' when the information is necessary to re-
present an individual in a judicial ... proceeding," the persons
with the need to know are only the persons representing the
individuals listed in section 1520.5(a), not the listed persons
themselves, and that pilots are not included on that list.'
Although the pilots were not eligible for Fifth Amendment
due process protections because of their non-resident alien sta-
tus, the court determined that they had received adequate due
process procedures in any event.' The court explained that
the pilots' interest in possessing airman certificates "pale[d] in
significance to the government's security interest in preventing
pilots from using civil aircraft as [weapons] of terror," and that
"[i] n light of the governmental interests at stake and the [SSI] ,"
substitute procedural safeguards against revoking the licenses
were impracticable and unnecessary.' 24
This case provides another example of a district court viewing
the disputed SSI materials in camera even though such a court
has no jurisdiction to determine whether the information has
been correctly designated as SSI.'2 5 Judges, however, do not
have to obtain security clearances to view the SSI'2 6 and district
courts have the ability to review SSI to determine the relevancy
of the responsive information to the plaintiffs' claims. 2 7 Many
courts use this reasoning to review the SSI in chambers and
make a determination based on the SSI even though that same
information is not made available to the plaintiffs.'
6. United States v. Moussaoui
In Moussaoui, the government requested a protective order
prohibiting the disclosure of discovery responses containing SSI
to the defendant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1183.
124 Id.
125 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(a) (West 2003).
" 6 See id. § 46110(b).
127 Bodenheimner, supira note 22, at 742.
128 Id.
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16(d) (1).121 The court ordered that material designated as SSI
could be viewed by defense counsel but could not be disclosed
by defense counsel to the defendant in any form, that papers
related to SSI that were filed with the court should be filed
under seal and not served on the defendant (although such doc-
uments were to be served on defense counsel), and that material
related to SSI would be under a protective order.130
The court explained that "certain of [the requested] docu-
ments contain[ed] information on security counter-measures
which might assist a potential hijacker or terrorist in circum-
venting aviation security procedures" and that there was a risk
that if the defendant were allowed access to the materials
sought, the material "could be disseminated to others intent on
attacking civil aviation" despite the security measures presently
in place.131 The court held that (1) the information is "either
not discoverable under Brady v. Maryland," and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(d) (1); or (2) "discovery value is substan-
tially satisfied by production to defense counsel and any loss in
discovery value is outweighed by the potential danger to the air
traveling public and national security that might ensue after dis-
closure.113 2 The court also held that "defense counsel must give
advance notice ... of any intention to use SSI ... at trial or in
any hearing[s]," so that the defendant may be excluded, brief-
ings may be sealed, and in camera argument may be arranged.1 33
This case is interesting, in part, because the government
chose to pursue a protective order in the first instance rather
than attempting to withhold the documents altogether or use
extensive redactions. 34 Also, it appears that instead of a com-
plete ex parte in camera review, the court chose to give the de-
fense counsel access to the material as long as he did not share it
with his client. 135 If the government had requested that the SSI
be withheld altogether and not shared with defense counsel, it
seems from other decisions that this request may have been
granted by the court.
129 United States v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11088,
at *1 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2002).
130 Id. at *3-4.
131 Id. at *2.
132 Id. at *2-3.
133 Id. at *3.




VII. THE FUTURE OF SSI
In June 2005, the GAO released a report that it prepared at
the request of several members of Congress concerning whether
the TSA is applying the SSI designation consistently and appro-
priately. 1 6 The report concludes that the TSA lacks guidance or
procedures for providing criteria used in determining what con-
stitutes SSI and has no policies on accounting for or tracking
documents designated as SSI.' 7
In response, Congress passed and the President signed into
law an appropriations bill for the DHS in late 2005 that directly
addresses these issues as follows: 138
* "[E]ach office within the [DHS] that handles documents
marked as [SSL] shall have at least one employee in that office
with the authority to coordinate and make determinations on be-
half of the agency that such documents meet the criteria for
marking as SSI."1
139
* The Secretary of DHS must provide the Committees on Appro-
priations of the Senate and the House of Representatives with an
annual report "on the titles of all DHS documents that are desig-
nated as SSI in their entirety during the period of January 1
through December 31 for the preceding year."'140
* The Secretary of DHS must promulgate guidelines, including
"extensive examples of SSI that further define the individual cat-
egories of information cited under 49 CFR 1520(b) (1) through(16). '' a
* The Secretary of DHS must also:
[S]ubmit to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives: (1) Department-wide poli-
cies for designating, coordinating and marking documents as
SSI; (2) Department-wide auditing and accountability proce-
dures for documents designated and marked as SSI; (3) the
total number of SSI Coordinators within the Department; and
(4) the total number of staff authorized to designate SSI docu-
ments within the Department.141
1 See generally id.
137 GOVFRNMENT AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLEAR POLICIES AND OVFRSIG;TI
NEEDED FOR DESIGNATION OF SENSITIVE SECURIT' INFORMATION (2005), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05677.pdf.
I'l Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No.
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The DHS issued rules regarding the handling of SSI in re-
sponse to the statutory mandate.' 43 Some highlights from the
SSI Management Directive are as follows:
e There are 225 SSI Coordinators within the DHS, and an in-
crease in the number of Coordinators is anticipated. SSI Coor-
dinators are responsible for making determinations that records
generated by the office are appropriately marked SSI (according
to 49 C.F.R. §1520.5 (b)), training personnel who access or gener-
ate SSI, and conducting periodic reviews and self-inspections re-
garding the application of SSI."
* "A record shall be maintained of each original SSI designation
made," including "the date, subject or title, and a detailed synop-
sis of the information." "[A] copy of the record and the informa-
tion to be protected shall be transmitted to the TSA SSI Program
Office within 30 days following the designation."'145
* "Any authorized holder of SSI who believes information has
been improperly . . . marked as SSI is encouraged to challenge
the marking" formally and in writing to the person who applied
the SSI marking, or to the SSI Program Office, the office SSI
Coordinator, or the DHS Office of Security. Informal challenges
made directly to the person who applied the SSI marking are also
encouraged. Individuals submitting a challenge shall not be sub-
ject to retribution, and requests for anonymity will be
honored.'46
e SSI Policy states that SSI shall only be used "to protect informa-
tion that would be detrimental to transportation security if pub-
licly disclosed," not to "conceal Government mismanagement or
other circumstances embarrassing to [the] Government."147
* "SSI may be mailed by U.S. Postal Service First Class mail or an
authorized commercial delivery service such as DHL or Federal
Express," sent by interoffice mail if it is in a sealed envelope, or
faxed if the sender "coordinate[s] with the recipient to ensure
that the materials faxed will not be left unattended . . . on the
receiving end." It may not generally be sent by e-mail unless it is
encrypted or transmitted within secure communications
systems. 1
4 8
143 See DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE No. 11056, SENSITIVE
SECURITY INFORMATION 1 (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs/md
11056.pdf.
144 Id. at 7.
145 Id. at 11.
146 Id. at 13-14.
147 Id. at 10.
148 id. at 17-18.
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e SSI should be destroyed "when no longer needed and its con-
tinued retention is not otherwise required.""'4
- A DHS SSI Oversight Committee shall be formed to "[b]e used
as a forum for the discussion of policies and procedures related
to the implementation, management and oversight of SSI.' ' 5"
VIII. CONCLUSION
In August 2004, Senator Ted Kennedy revealed to a Senate
Judiciary Committee that he had appeared on a No-Fly list and
had been repeatedly delayed at airports.'"' It took him three
weeks of appeals to the TSA to have his name removed from the
list of potential terrorists. 52 It turns out that the name was ad-
ded to the list because "T. Kennedy" was once used as an alias of
a suspected terrorist. 5  Kennedy told the story to underscore
the point that although he, as a senator, was in a privileged posi-
tion to contact Tom Ridge at the DHS, "ordinary citizens" would
have more trouble getting their names off the list. 154
Likewise, Representative Helen Chenoweth-Hage refused to
be patted down at an airport during a second screening and,
instead, rented a car to drive 420 miles instead of getting on her
flight. 5  "She said she wanted to see the regulation that re-
quired the additional procedure for secondary screening and
she was told that she couldn't see it," said Julian Gonzales, the
TSA's security director for the Boise, Twin Falls, and Sun Valley
airports. 151 "She refused to go through additional screening,
and she was not allowed to fly. It's pretty simple."'' 57 Why
couldn't they let her see the regulation? "Because we don't have
to," Gonzales said.15 1 "That is called 'security sensitive informa-
tion.' She's not allowed to see it, nor is anyone else."'15'
Courts around the United States are deferring to the govern-
ment's designation of information as SSI and restricting or, in
149 Id. at 19.
I50 Id. at 8.
, Sara Kehaulani Goo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, WAsi. POST, Aug.
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many cases, prohibiting a plaintiff's access to that information
even when it is essential to the maintenance of a claim. So far,
the designation of material as SSI has been wholly within the
discretion of the TSA and has been an inquiry and decision-
making process closed to the outside world. The compromise
can be viewed as the lesser of two known evils, the greater evil
being the real, continuing threat ef terrorist acts against Ameri-
can citizens. However, it was recently decided that the TSA's
ability to designate material as SSI will no longer be without
oversight. 60 Because the recently passed SSI Management Di-
rective provides more internal structure to the designation of
SSI by the TSA, future courts may be even more willing to defer
to that designation, thereby curtailing plaintiffs' hopes of
greater access to this information.
160 See generally DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 143.
